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Abstract
In  this  paper  I  propose  an  account  of  representation  for  scientific  models  based  on 
Kendall  Walton’s  ‘make-believe’  theory  of  representation  in  art.  I  first  set  out  the 
problem of  scientific  representation  and  respond  to  a  recent  argument  due  to  Craig 
Callender  and Jonathan Cohen,  which aims to  show that  the  problem may be easily 
dismissed. I then introduce my account of models as props in games of make-believe and 
show  how  it  offers  a  solution  to  the  problem.  Finally,  I  demonstrate  an  important 
advantage my account has over other theories of scientific representation. All existing 
theories  analyse  scientific  representation  in  terms  of  relations,  such  as  similarity  or 
denotation.  By contrast,  my account  does  not  take representation in  modelling to  be  
essentially  relational.  For  this  reason,  it  can  accommodate  a  group  of  models  often 
ignored  in  discussions  of  scientific  representation,  namely  models  which  are 
representational but which represent no actual object.
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I Representation in modelling
(i) The problem of scientific representation
When we think of scientific models, perhaps the first things that come to mind are ‘ball-and-stick’ 
models of molecules or astronomical models of the solar system.  Let us refer to such models as 
physical models, to indicate that they are actual, physical objects.  Most philosophical work focuses 
not on physical models but on what I shall call theoretical modelling.  Suppose we want to predict the 
behaviour of a bob bouncing on the end of a spring.  To do so we might use Hooke’s law to formulate 
the equation of motion for a simple harmonic oscillator, m d 2 x / dt 2=−kx , where m is the mass of 
the bob, k is the ‘spring constant’ and x is the displacement from the equilibrium position.  In using 
this equation we make a number of assumptions: we take the bob to be a point mass m subject only to 
a uniform gravitational field and a linear restoring force exerted by a massless frictionless spring with 
spring constant k attached to a rigid surface.  This is what Nancy Cartwright (1983) calls a ‘prepared 
description’ of the bouncing spring system.1  We realise that this description is false, but using it 
allows us to apply our equation of motion and calculate predictions for the bob’s behaviour.  This is 
an example of theoretical modelling: we model the bob as a simple harmonic oscillator.2
Many physical models represent some object or event in the world.  Crick and Watson’s famous 
model represents the DNA molecule.  The astronomical models represent the solar system.  An 
engineer’s scale model might represent a bridge.  We also represent the world through theoretical 
modelling.  Of course, despite Cartwright’s terminology, we cannot regard our ’prepared description’ 
or equation of motion as straightforward descriptions of the bouncing spring; we realise that the bob is 
not a point mass and do not claim that it is.  And yet we do represent the spring when we model it. 
Intuitively, we might say that we represent it as a simple harmonic oscillator.  Put simply, the problem 
of representation for scientific models is to understand how such cases of representation work.  In the 
case of theoretical modelling, this problem takes different forms depending on which view we adopt 
of the ontology of theoretical models.3  For example, according to Ronald Giere, a theoretical model 
like our model of the bouncing spring is not the prepared description and equation of motion that we 
1Cartwright (1983).
2 Note that I use the term ‘theoretical’ only to indicate that scientists do not construct a physical model of the 
system modelled, and not to imply that the model is derived from some existing theory, like Newtonian 
mechanics.  Recent case studies suggest scientists must often go beyond existing theory to model a system; for 
example, see Morgan and Morrison (1999).
3 For my own view of the ontology of theoretical modelling, see Toon (2010).
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write down, but some form of abstract entity that they define.  Giere offers an indirect, two-stage, 
view of theoretical modelling:  First, prepared descriptions and theoretical laws define abstract 
objects. Second, these objects represent (or, as Giere would put it, are used to represent) the system 
being modelled.  If we adopt this view, then, understanding how we represent the bouncing spring is a 
matter of understanding the relation between the spring and the abstract simple harmonic oscillator 
defined by our prepared description and equation of motion.
To understand the problem of representation for models, it is helpful to look to another 
representational device: pictures.  Like models, many pictures are representational, and some 
represent actual objects or events.  Jacques-Louis David’s Napoleon Crossing the Saint Bernard 
represents Napoleon.  Constable’s Salisbury Cathedral from the Meadows represents Salisbury 
Cathedral.  The problem for theories of pictorial representation is to understand how they do this.  In 
itself, Constable’s painting is merely a collection of brushstrokes on a piece of canvas.  And yet it 
depicts horses pulling a cart through a stream and the Cathedral beneath a rainbow.  How does it do 
this?  In virtue of what does Constable’s painting represent the Cathedral?  The problem of 
representation for scientific models may be presented in the same way.  The reconstruction of Crick 
and Watson’s original DNA model in the Science Museum is simply a collection of metal rods and 
plates held in place by clamps.  And yet it represents the complex helical structure of the DNA 
molecule.  How does it do this?  In virtue of what does the model represent the molecule?
We have a name for the sort of representation pictures provide.  We say that David’s painting pictures 
or depicts Napoleon, and that Constable’s landscape depicts Salisbury Cathedral.  Of course, pictures 
represent in other ways too, apart from depiction.  David’s painting might be said to represent the 
glory of France, or Constable’s ‘the culmination of his numerous treatments of Salisbury Cathedral’.4 
Such is the vagueness of the term ‘represent’.  But it is one particular form of representation that 
pictures offer, namely depiction, which theories of pictorial representation seek to explain.
We lack a name for the way that models represent.  If we say merely that models represent their 
objects then we are likely to be misled, for the word ‘representation’ is used in so many different 
ways.  Crick and Watson’s model might also be said to represent the greatest achievement of British 
science or Bohr’s model a belief in the simplicity of the atomic realm.  In analogy to pictorial 
representation, then, we might label the form of representation we are interested in model-
representation.  Crick and Watson’s model, we shall say, model-represents the DNA molecule and 
Bohr’s model model-represents the atom.
4 Salisbury Cathedral from the Meadows on www.nationalgallery.org.uk
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We must be careful here, however.  The variety of scientific models is remarkable.  What reason do 
we have for thinking that all of these models represent in the same way?   Does Crick and Watson’s 
model represent the DNA molecule in the same way as Bohr’s model represents the atom, for 
example, or our model represents the bouncing spring?  Might there not be many forms of model-
representation?  Here the contrast with depiction is telling.  The variety of things we call ‘pictures’ is 
also remarkable.  It includes figurative paintings, Impressionist landscapes, political cartoons, 
children’s drawings, stick figures and more.  And yet despite their obvious differences, it is often 
thought that there is one form of representation that is common to all of these pictures, namely 
depiction.  We lack the same intuitions for scientific models.  Whether or not there is a form of 
representation common to both Crick and Watson’s and Bohr’s models, for example, would seem to 
be an open question that a theory of scientific representation must address.
We should not assume, then, that there is one form of representation common to all scientific models: 
there may be many different forms of model-representation.5  And we should also be careful not to 
assume that any of these forms of representation are unique to scientific models.  Any, or even all, of 
the forms of model-representation that we identify may turn out to be employed by other 
representational devices, used either within or outside of science.  Our theory of representation does 
not need to go on to say how, if at all, scientific models differ from these other representational 
devices, although this may be an interesting question in its own right.
The task of explaining how models represent is usually taken to be that of providing an account of a 
relation, between a model and that part of the world that it represents.  For example, according to 
Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen, the central question concerning representation for scientific 
models is ‘what constitutes the representation relation between a model and the world?’6  The task for 
theories of depiction is often presented in the same way.  A theory of depiction, it is often said, must 
tell us what the relation is between a picture and its subject, in virtue of which it depicts that subject. 
The difficulty with presenting the task in this way, of course, is that many pictures have no actual 
subject.  And yet it seems that a picture of a unicorn is still depictive, even though there is no unicorn 
that it depicts.  In Section III of this paper, I will argue that the same problem arises for scientific 
models: many models are representational, even though they represent no actual object.7  If we want 
to allow that such models are representational then we are faced with a dilemma: either we postulate 
some entity that they represent or we cease to think of model-representation as essentially relational. 
5 Versions of this point may be found in Frigg (2006), Hughes (1997) and Suárez (2003), although each draw 
rather different lessons from it.
6 Callender and Cohen (2006), p68.  See also Frigg (2006a) and Hughes (1997). 
7 This problem is also raised by Suárez (2003) and Callender and Cohen (2006).  As we shall see in Section III, 
however, neither provide a solution.
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We ought, therefore, to refrain from presenting our task as that of giving an account of representation 
as a relation if we do not want to commit ourselves prematurely to the first route out of this dilemma.
(ii) Misrepresentation
Most models are inaccurate (or incorrect or unrealistic) in some way.  Often this is deliberate.  When 
we model the bouncing spring, for instance, we neglect the effects of air resistance.  Sometimes, 
inaccuracy is unintentional: before building their famous double-helical model, for example, Crick 
and Watson constructed and rejected a number of different models of the DNA molecule.  For our 
present purposes, the important point to notice is that inaccurate (or incorrect or unrealistic) models 
are still representations, and so must be accommodated by our theory of model-representation.  Our 
simple harmonic oscillator model and a model that accounts for air resistance both represent the 
bouncing spring, and Crick and Watson’s early efforts, like their final double-helical model, all 
represent the DNA molecule.
Many people share the intuition that an account of scientific representation should accommodate 
inaccurate, as well as accurate, models.  For example, Mauricio Suárez writes that 
we shall not require a theory of representation to mark or explain the distinction between accurate  
and  inaccurate  representation,  or  between  a  reliable  and  unreliable  one,  but  merely  between 
something that is a representation and something that is not.8
Some will disagree, however.  Use of terms such as ‘representation’ or ‘depiction’ is often vague and 
subject to dispute.  Are doodles really depictions?  What about stick men?  For some, ‘representation’ 
carries implications of realism, or at least empirical adequacy, when used with regard to scientific 
models.  Although I do not understand the term in this way, I do not, of course, deny that the question 
of what makes one model more accurate or realistic than another is an important one.  I claim only 
that this question need not be addressed by our theory of representation for models, which is 
concerned with the prior question of what makes something a model-representation.  Once we 
understand how models represent, we will want to make further distinctions among models, 
distinguishing good from bad along various different dimensions.  If someone wishes to reserve the 
term ‘representation’ for those models that fall only on the good side of one or more of these divides 
then we needn’t quibble too much.  The more important point is that our account of representation 
should provide us with the resources to make these distinctions amongst models.
8 Suárez (2003), p226.  See also Callender and Cohen (2006) and Frigg (2006a).
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The situation is similar with pictures.  We often judge the realism of pictures, counting a Rembrandt 
more realistic than a cave painting or a Picasso. 9  This raises the longstanding question of what makes 
one picture more realistic than another.   Many theories of depiction suggest a natural answer to this 
question.  For example, the view that pictures depict in virtue of similarity suggests a straightforward 
account of realism: the more a picture resembles its object, the more realistic it is.  However, the 
question of what constitutes realism need not be addressed by a theory of depiction.  Unrealistic 
pictures are still pictures; they still depict their objects.  It is this which a theory of depiction must try 
to understand.
(iii) Does the problem exist?
The problem of representation in scientific modelling is now the focus of a burgeoning literature in 
the philosophy of science.  Indeed, it is often referred to simply as ‘the problem of scientific 
representation’.  However, in a recent paper, Craig Callender and Jonathan Cohen have argued that 
this attention is unwarranted.  In fact, they claim, ‘there is no special problem about scientific 
representation’.10  In this section, and the one that follows, I shall attempt to show why Callender and 
Cohen are wrong.  In doing so, I hope to clarify further the nature of the problem that faces us.
Callender and Cohen argue that we should approach the problem of scientific representation from a 
stance which they label as ‘General Griceanism’.  According to this view,
among  the  many  sorts  of  representational  entities  (cars,  cakes,  equations,  etc.),  the 
representational  status  of  most  of  them  is  derivative  from  the  representational  status  of  a 
privileged  core  of  representations.   […]  artistic,  linguistic,  representation  and  culinary 
representation […] can be explained (in a unified way) as deriving from some more fundamental  
sorts of representations, which are typically taken to be mental states.11
A General Gricean account of representation therefore consists of two stages:
First, it  explains the representational  powers of derivative representations in terms of those of 
fundamental representations; second, it offers some other story to explain representation for the 
fundamental bearers of content.12
9 Of course, this is not to claim that realism in modelling is the same as realism in painting.
10 Callender and Cohen (2006)
11 Ibid., p70
12 Ibid., p71
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It is by adopting this General Gricean position that Callender and Cohen believe we may ‘solve or 
dissolve the so-called ‘problem of scientific representation’’:  13
Our  proposal  […]  is  that  scientific  representation  is  just  another  species  of  derivative 
representation to which the General Gricean account is straightforwardly applicable.  This means 
that,  while there may be outstanding issues about  representation,  there is  no special  problem 
about scientific representation.14
Callender and Cohen offer little argument in support of a General Gricean position.  But let us, for the 
moment, suppose that we were to accept their proposal.  What would this mean for our enquiry into 
model-representation?  Presumably, the first stage would be to provide an account of how models 
represent in terms of some other, more fundamental form of representation such as mental or 
linguistic representation.  Let us call such an account a derivative account of model-representation.  A 
derivative account would attempt to show how the representational power of models derives from 
some other form of representation.  By contrast, a non-derivative account would attempt to explain 
how models represent in non-representational terms.  According to Callender and Cohen, providing a 
derivative account of model-representation ‘amounts to a relatively trivial trade of one philosophical 
problem for another’.15  But if we could take this first step then we would have at least reduced the 
problem of explaining how models represent to the problem of explaining some other form of 
representation.  And we might even feel at this stage that our work as philosophers of science was 
complete.  The second step, of providing an account of the more fundamental form of representation, 
might be left to those working in the philosophy of mind or language.
However, immediately after they propose that we adopt the General Gricean approach to explain how 
models represent, Callender and Cohen expand on their claim in the following way:
[W]e  propose  that  the  varied  representational  vehicles  used  in  scientific  settings  (models, 
equations, toothpick constructions, drawings, etc.) represent their targets (the behavior of ideal 
gases, quantum state evolutions, bridges) by virtue of the mental states of their makers/users.  For  
example, the drawing represents the bridge because the maker of the drawing stipulates that it 
does, and intends to activate in his audience (consumers of the representational vehicle, including 
possibly himself) the belief that it does.16
This further claim comes as a surprise.   Rather than being asked to take the first step in our General 
Gricean account of scientific representation, we are told that this step has already been taken.  We do 
13 Ibid., p67
14 Ibid., p77.  Emphasis in original.
15 Ibid., p73
16 Ibid., p75
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not need to provide a derivative account of representation for models.  In fact, this account has a very 
simple form:  all that is required for a model to represent its target is that the user of the model 
stipulate that it does, and that he intend to bring about the belief that it does.  Consequently, Callender 
and Cohen claim, ‘scientific representation […] is constituted in terms of a stipulation, together with 
an underlying theory of representation for mental states’.17  The representational relation between a 
drawing and a bridge, for example, is ‘the product of mere stipulative fiat’.  18  If this is correct, then 
there is indeed no special problem about scientific representation.  Philosophers of science need no 
longer occupy themselves with finding even a derivative account of how models represent.  It requires 
only an act of stipulation to bring about an instance of scientific representation.  The remaining 
puzzles may be left to philosophers of mind.
What are we to make of this claim?  Callender and Cohen seem to think that it follows directly from 
the General Gricean position.  But it is difficult to see why this should be the case.  It is one thing to 
claim that the representation relation between model and target exists only in virtue of some other, 
more fundamental, form of representation, such as mental representation; it is quite another thing to 
claim that an act of stipulation is sufficient to bring about this representational relation.  In the first 
case, we claim merely that some form of derivative account of scientific representation may be found; 
in the second we commit ourselves to one particular, very simple, form that this account might take.  
The parallel with depiction is helpful here.  Suppose that we were to adopt the General Gricean 
position with regard to depiction.  This would commit us to offering a derivative account that 
explained depiction in terms of some other, more fundamental form of representation.  In fact, there 
are rather a lot of existing accounts that we could draw upon here.  Consider the reconstruction of 
Plato’s account of depiction offered by Alan Goldman,:
a picture represents an object if and only if (a) its artist successfully intends by marking a surface 
to create a visual experience that resembles that of the object, (b) such that the intention can be 
recovered from the experience, perhaps together with certain supplementary information, and (c) 
the object can be seen in the picture19
This account attempts to explain depiction in terms of, amongst other things, the intention of the artist 
to create a certain visual experience of an object.  If successful, it will reduce the problem of depiction 
to some other problem (or problems) concerning mental representation.  Or, to take another example, 
consider Kendall Walton’s make-believe theory of depiction.20  I will be discussing Walton’s views 
17 Ibid., p78
18 Ibid., p75
19 Goldman (2003), p194. Emphasis in original.
20 See Chapter 8 of Walton (1990).
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more fully in Section II.  For now, all that is important is that for Walton, depiction is explained in 
terms of particular acts of imaginings engaged in by the viewer of the picture: she imagines of her 
looking at the picture that it is an instance of looking at the object.  Again, Walton’s is a derivative 
account: it aims to explain depiction in terms of the representational capacities of mental states (in this 
case, imagination).
Either Goldman’s or Walton’s theories might constitute the first step in a General Gricean account of 
depiction.  Yet the two accounts are very different, and the continuing debate over depiction suggests 
that taking either step would be far from trivial.  Moreover, neither Goldman nor Walton’s account 
parallels the derivative account of scientific representation offered by Callender and Cohen. 
Presumably, such an account would claim that a picture depicts its subject if the painter stipulates that 
it does and intends to bring about the belief in the viewer that it does.  Neither Goldman nor Walton 
take such an act of stipulation to be sufficient for depiction.  And it is clear why they do not, for 
stipulation is plainly not sufficient for depiction.  Suppose we took a blank canvas and stipulated that 
it represented Napoleon, and that that we intended to bring about the belief in others that this canvas 
represented Napoleon.  And suppose further that this intention was recognised and our audience did 
believe that the canvas represented Napoleon.  The blank canvas might, then, be said to represent 
Napoleon, in some sense, but it would not depict him.
Adopting the General Gricean position with regard to pictures, then, does not commit us to the view 
that stipulation is sufficient for depiction, but instead leaves open many different ways of explaining 
depiction in terms of other, more fundamental forms of representation.  Similarly, we might adopt a 
General Gricean approach to models without taking stipulation to be sufficient for model-
representation.  Just as there are many different candidates for a derivative account of depiction, so 
there might be many different derivative accounts of model-representation.  Nevertheless, we might 
still ask whether the account that Callender and Cohen propose is successful.
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(iv) Stipulation and salt shakers
Is an act of stipulation sufficient for model-representation?  To support their claim that it is, Callender 
and Cohen ask us to suppose that we were to pick up a salt shaker and stipulate to our dinner partner 
that it represents Madagascar.  As long as our stipulation is understood, they point out,
when your dinner partner asks you what is your favorite geographical land mass, you can make 
the salt  shaker  salient  with the  reasonable  intention  that  your  doing so  will  activate  in  your  
audience the belief that Madagascar is your favorite geographical land mass21
According to Callender and Cohen, this shows that an act of stipulation, if properly recognised, is 
sufficient to establish an instance of scientific representation.  Is this correct?  Would we say that the 
salt shaker represents Madagascar?  In some sense of the term ‘represents’ no doubt we would; again, 
the term is loose enough to support many different uses.  But would we say that the salt shaker is a 
model-representation of Madagascar?  Would it represent Madagascar in the same way that Crick and 
Watson’s model represents the DNA molecule, for example, or Bohr’s model represents the atom?
Let us again look to depiction.  Perhaps the account of depiction that comes closest to claiming that 
stipulation is sufficient for depiction is Nelson Goodman’s conventionalist account.  According to 
Goodman, the relation between a picture and what it depicts is like that between a name and its 
referent; both refer to, stand for, or denote, their objects.  Resemblance or similarity are neither 
necessary nor sufficient conditions for a picture to denote its object.  In fact, ‘almost anything may 
stand for almost anything else’..22  One way to establish denotation, it seems, is by stipulation.  If we 
stipulate that the blank canvas represents Napoleon then the canvas may be said to denote Napoleon. 
However, even Goodman does not take denotation to be sufficient for depiction.  Instead, he 
recognises that his theory must account for the considerable intuitive differences between pictorial 
and non-pictorial representations.  And he attempts to do so by presenting a number of formal criteria 
that are intended to distinguish pictorial symbol systems from non-pictorial ones, such as linguistic or 
diagrammatic symbol systems.
Both David’s portrait and the name ‘Napoleon’ may be said to represent Napoleon.  Perhaps both 
‘refer to’ or ‘denote’ him.  Similarly, both Crick and Watson’s model and ‘DNA molecule’ might be 
said to represent or refer to or denote the DNA molecule.  But any theory of depiction which counted 
21 Callender and Cohen (2006), p74
22 Goodman (1976), p5
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the name ‘Napoleon’ a depiction of Napoleon would have failed to capture something important about 
the way that David’s portrait represents Napoleon.  Similarly, it seems that any theory of model-
representation that counted ‘DNA molecule’ a model-representation of the DNA molecule would 
have failed to capture something important about the way Crick and Watson’s model represents the 
DNA molecule.  It would have failed to characterise the particular form of representation that Crick 
and Watson’s model provides.  Our intuitions regarding scientific models are perhaps less clear-cut 
than our intuitions regarding pictures.  But there still seem to be many differences between Crick and 
Watson’s model and the name ‘DNA molecule’ that our theory must explain.  The form of the name 
‘DNA molecule’ is ultimately arbitrary, for example; any combination of letters could have done the 
job just as well.  But the form of Crick and Watson’s model was the subject of years of research and 
careful adjustment.  Unlike the name ‘DNA molecule’, Crick and Watson’s model seems to ‘tell us’ 
something about the DNA molecule, and we feel that in some way what it tells us can be right or 
wrong, accurate or inaccurate.  Our theory of how models represent must account for these intuitions.
In the next section I will propose an account of scientific representation.  First, however, let us sum up 
the problem that faces us.  Many scientific models are representational.  Some represent actual objects 
or events.  The problem of scientific representation asks how they do this.  Why does Crick and 
Watson’s model represent the DNA molecule, or our model represent the bouncing spring?  There 
may turn out to be many different forms of model-representation.  Any, or even all, of these forms of 
representation may be employed by other representational devices, apart from scientific models.  We 
want an account of each of these forms of model-representation.  Theories of depiction aim to state 
conditions that are necessary and sufficient for something to be a depiction.  Similarly, if possible, we 
want to provide a set of conditions that are both individually necessary and jointly sufficient to 
establish an instance of each form of model-representation that we identify.  Our intuitions are less 
clear-cut in the case of models than for pictures.  But our account should be able to distinguish models 
from merely denoting entities, like names or Callender and Cohen’s salt shaker, as well as excluding 
non-representational entities, like ordinary chairs, tables or trees.23  And it should also accommodate 
inaccurate or incorrect models, as well as accurate or correct ones.
23 Of course, in certain cases such objects may be representational.  A chair might be used in a work of abstract 
art, for example, or a table used to represent a shelter in a play.
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II Models as make-believe
(i) Walton’s theory: props and games
According to Walton, representations are props in games of make-believe.  Suppose that some 
children play a game in the woods in which they imagine tree stumps to be bears.  In Walton’s 
terminology, in this game the tree stumps are props and the convention that the children establish by 
their agreement that stumps ‘count as’ bears is a principle of generation.  Together, props and 
principles of generation make propositions fictional.  To say that a proposition is fictional, on 
Walton’s theory, is to say that there is a prescription to imagine it.  (A fictional truth is simply the fact 
that a certain proposition is fictional.)  Thus, given the rule that stumps ‘count as’ bears, if a 
participant in the game comes across a stump in a thicket, they are to imagine that there is a bear 
there; it is fictional that there is a bear there.24
What is fictional in a game of make-believe need not be the same as what is imagined.  A stump 
which remains hidden under a pile of leaves still makes it fictional that a bear lurks there, even if this 
is never imagined by anyone playing the game.  An oddly shaped stump might prompt one of the 
participants to imagine a wolf and not a bear, but the proposition that there is a wolf before them is 
only imagined, not fictional.  Fictional truths therefore possess a certain kind of ‘objectivity’; 
participants can be unaware of fictional truths and mistaken about them.
The stumps in the children’s game are not representations, however.  A representation, in Walton’s 
sense, is not something that merely happens to be used as a prop; it is something of which it is the 
function to serve as such.25  Whether it is the function of a given object to serve as a prop depends 
upon social context.  Walton’s theory does not aim to analyse our ordinary use of the term 
‘representation’, but to ‘carve out a new category’ that may be applied to what we might call works of 
fiction, including novels, paintings, sculptures, plays, films and musical works.26  Many other entities 
that we might normally call ‘representations’, such as most history books, newspaper articles, 
biographies or textbooks, Walton thinks, do not count as representations in his sense.27  The function 
of a biography of Napoleon, it seems, is not to prescribe imaginings about Napoleon, but to make 
certain claims about him.  The biography does ask us to believe certain things of Napoleon, and it is 
24 These central features of the account are introduced in Section 1.5 of Walton (1990).
25 See Section 1.7 of Walton (1990).
26 Walton (1990), p2
27 See Chapter 2 of Walton (1990). 
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arguable that believing something requires us to imagine it.  But there is no rule that we ought to 
believe what the biography says about Napoleon simply because it says it.  On the other hand, Walton 
claims, there is a rule that we ought to imagine certain things of Napoleon when we read War and 
Peace, simply because the novel is written as it is.  For this reason, the novel counts as a 
representation in Walton’s sense.
Something is an object of a representation on Walton’s theory if there are propositions about it which 
the representation makes fictional.28  Napoleon is an object of War and Peace, as is St. Petersburg. 
Salisbury Cathedral is an object of Constable’s Salisbury Cathedral from the Meadows. 
Representation-as is a matter of what propositions about an object a representation makes fictional. 
War and Peace makes it fictional that Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812; it represents Napoleon as 
invading Russia in 1812.  Sometimes, when we call something ‘fictional’ we do so to imply that it is 
false or even deceitful.  To say a proposition is fictional in Walton’s sense, however, is simply to say 
that there is a prescription to imagine it.  This is perfectly compatible with truth.   If a child screams 
when he comes across a stump in the woods, it will probably be fictional that he screams; it is both 
fictional and true that the child screams.  Similarly, of course, it is true, as well as fictional in War 
and Peace, that Napoleon invaded Russia in 1812.  In this respect, the novel corresponds to Napoleon. 
If a representation corresponds completely with its object then it matches it.  But a work may 
represent something it does not match and match something it does not represent.  It is fictional in 
The War of the Worlds that Martians attack London in the late nineteenth century.  The novel 
represents London, but does not match it.  Conversely, a portrait of John may match his twin brother 
David, but it represents John and not David.
As well as prescribing imaginings, the stumps in the children’s game are also objects of those 
imaginings: the children imagine of the stumps that they are bears.  This is not a necessary condition 
for something to count as a prop.  The text of War and Peace may prescribe us to imagine many 
things of Napoleon, but we do not imagine the text of the novel itself to be Napoleon.  Some works of 
fiction do prescribe imaginings about themselves, however.  For example, we are to imagine that the 
first chapter of the novel Dracula is an excerpt from a journal.  Walton calls these reflexive 
representations.29
The principle that wherever there is a stump, fictionally, there is a bear, was established by 
participants in the game by explicit stipulation.  But Walton’s theory does not demand that principles 
of generation be established in this way, nor that they be explicitly formulated.  And indeed, many 
28 See Chapter 3 of Walton (1990).
29 Ibid.., p117
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implicit rules are likely to operate in the children’s game: it may well be that if the stump in the 
thicket is taller than the stump under the leaves, then, fictionally, the bear in the thicket is taller than 
the bear hiding in the leaves.  In the case of novels or paintings, principles of generation are difficult 
to specify explicitly, complex, and vary from case to case.  The principles that apply to novels are 
conditional upon the text of the novel; those that apply to paintings or statues depend upon the 
distribution of paint on the canvas or on the form of the sculpted marble.
(ii) Make-believe and model-representation
With this outline of Walton’s theory in place, let us now begin to apply it to scientific models.30  First, 
consider a physical model, such as a 1:1000 scale model of the Forth Road Bridge.  I think we may 
regard this model as a representation in Walton’s sense: the model functions as a prop in games of 
make-believe.  These games are governed by certain principles of generation, appropriate for such 
models.  One principle is that, if part of the model has a certain length, then we should imagine the 
corresponding part of the bridge to be a thousand times longer.  Together, the model and principles of 
generation determine what users of the model are supposed to imagine; in Walton’s terminology, they 
generate fictional truths.  Some of these fictional truths are about the bridge itself.  For example, if the 
model is a metre long, it will be fictional that the bridge is a thousand metres long.  The bridge is 
therefore an object of the model;  the model represents it as a thousand metres long.  Since the Forth 
Road Bridge is in fact 1006m long, the model represents the bridge but does not match it.
I propose that we regard all physical models in this way, as props in games of make-believe, which 
represent their objects by prescribing imaginings about them.  The principles of generation by which 
models prescribe imaginings will vary from case to case.  Were the bridge model built to carry out 
structural tests, for example, one principle of generation in effect may be that if the model is built 
from a certain material then it is fictional that the bridge is also built from that material.  If, instead, 
the model were built for a museum display, however, this principle may not hold.  Furthermore, not 
all physical models are scale models.  The famous Phillips machine represents the workings of the 
macro-economy by the ebb and flow of coloured water in a hydraulic system.  The principles guiding 
our imaginings when we use the Phillips machine will be very different from those that apply to the 
bridge model.  One principle may be that if water is flowing through a certain pipe then, fictionally, 
taxes are being paid.  Many physical models are reflexive representations, in Walton’s sense: they 
30 The suggestion that Walton’s theory may be applied in the context of scientific modelling is also made in 
Barberousse (2006), Barberousse and Ludwig (2000) and Frigg (2010). See below for a discussion of Frigg’s 
views.
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prescribe imaginings about themselves.  When we use the bridge model, for example, we not only 
imagine things of the bridge; we also imagine that the model itself is the bridge.  Similarly, we 
imagine the balls of a ball-and-stick chemical model to be atoms, and the sticks to be bonds between 
them.  Physical models need not be reflexive, however.  When we use the Phillips machine, perhaps 
we do not imagine the flow of water itself to be the payment of taxes, but only that taxes are being 
paid.
Let us now turn to consider theoretical modelling.  When we model the bouncing spring we write 
down an equation of motion m d 2 x / dt 2=−kx , and a prepared description, which takes the bob to 
be a point mass m subject to a linear restoring force, and so on.  I believe these may be understood in 
the same way that Walton understands literary works of fiction.  Consider the following passage from 
The War of the Worlds:
The dome of St. Paul's was dark against the sunrise, and injured, I saw for the first time, by a huge 
gaping cavity on its western side.31
Clearly, this is not a description of St Paul’s Cathedral: when Wells wrote this he was not claiming 
that there really was a hole in the side of St Paul’s.  Nevertheless, on Walton’s view, the passage still 
represents St Paul’s; St Paul’s is an object of The War of the Worlds.  Usually, Walton thinks, when 
we read a linguistic work of fiction that uses proper names, we take ourselves to be prescribed to 
imagine things of the normal referents of those names.  On this view, the above passage represents 
(the actual) St. Paul’s, because it requires readers to imagine certain things of St Paul’s, namely that it 
has a large hole in its dome.  In Walton’s terminology, the passage makes it fictional that St Paul’s has 
a large hole in its dome.
I think we may use Walton’s analysis to provide an account of our prepared description and equation 
of motion.  We have seen that these are not straightforward descriptions of the bouncing spring. 
Nevertheless, I believe, they do represent the spring, in Walton’s sense: they represent the spring by 
prescribing imaginings about it.  When we put forward our prepared description and equation of 
motion, I think, those who are familiar with the process of theoretical modelling understand that they 
are to imagine certain things about the bouncing spring.  Specifically, they are required to imagine 
that the bob is a point mass, that the spring exerts a linear restoring force, and so on.  Unlike some 
physical models, our theoretical model is not a reflexive representation: we do not imagine that our 
description or equation are themselves a point mass or subject to a linear restoring force.  Instead, our 
description and equation prescribe imaginings about the bouncing spring system. The bouncing spring 
31 Wells (2005), p170
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is an object of our model; our model represents it as a point mass, subject to a linear restoring force 
and a uniform gravitational field.  Using Walton’s terminology, we may say that our prepared 
description and equation of motion make it fictional that the bob is a point mass, that it is subject to a 
linear restoring force and so on. 
My suggestion, then, is that models function as props in games of make-believe; model-representation 
is an instance of representation in Walton’s sense.  Tentatively, I claim that this notion of model-
representation applies to all physical and theoretical modelling.  In physical modelling, the prop is a 
physical object, while in theoretical modelling, it is usually a prepared description and equation of 
motion.  In some cases, the prop might be a diagram or picture.  Just as for novels or paintings, the 
principles of generation governing the games in which these props function are complex and vary 
from case to case.  In each case, however, the model represents in virtue of prescribing us to imagine 
things.  We may formulate this account as follows:
M is a model-representation if and only if M functions as a prop in a game of make-believe (MM)
As we have seen, something is an object of a representation, on Walton’s theory, if there are 
propositions about it which the model makes fictional.  Taking this criterion together with the account 
(MM) allows us to state the conditions under which a model will represent some actual system:
M model-represents T if and only if M functions as a prop in a game of make-believe in which 
propositions about T are made fictional (MM1)
On the account I propose, then, where a model represents an actual system, it does so by prescribing 
imaginings about that system; in Walton’s terminology, it makes propositions about the system 
fictional.  However, the primary statement of the account remains that given in MM: a model M is a 
model-representation, if and only if, if functions as a prop in a game of make-believe; it need not 
prescribe imaginings about any actual system.  We shall see the importance of this feature of the 
account in Section III.
In the remainder of this paper, I will try to demonstrate the advantages of the account of 
representation I have proposed.  First, however, it is important that this account is distinguished from 
another recent application of Walton’s theory to scientific models.  Frigg (2010) also suggests that the 
descriptions presented in theoretical modelling should be understood as props in Walton’s sense.  On 
his view, however, these descriptions prescribe us to imagine what he calls ‘model systems’, where 
these are to be understood as
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imagined physical systems, i.e. as hypothetical entities that, as a matter of fact, do not exist spatio-
temporally  but  are  nevertheless  not  purely  mathematical  or  structural  in  that  they  would  be 
physical things if they were real32
Frigg calls the means by which prepared descriptions and equations of motion give rise to these model 
systems ‘p-representation’.  For him, it is only this p-representation that is to be understood using 
Walton’s theory.  There is then a second representation relation, which he calls ‘t-representation’, that 
exists between model systems and the world.
Frigg’s account is therefore very different from that proposed in this paper.  Like Giere, Frigg offers 
an indirect, two-stage, view of scientific modelling: prepared descriptions and equations of motion 
first give rise to model systems (p-representation) and these in turn represent the system being 
modelled (t-representation).  By contrast, I do not take prepared descriptions and equations of motion 
to give rise to model systems.  On my account, the prepared description and equation of motion that 
we write down when we model the bouncing spring, for example, do not prescribe us to imagine an 
‘imagined’ or ‘hypothetical’ ideal oscillator.  Rather, they prescribe us to imagine propositions about  
the actual bouncing spring: we imagine of the actual bob that it is a point mass and of the actual 
spring that it is massless, and so on.33  On my account, then, there are not two forms of representation 
relation, but only one, given by MM1: the prepared description and equation of motion represent the 
bouncing spring directly, by prescribing imaginings about it.
Frigg’s proposal is interesting, and its relationship to the account I have put forward merits further 
investigation.  One reason I have for preferring my own application of Walton’s theory has to do with 
questions regarding the nature of model systems.  What exactly are ‘imagined concrete systems’ or 
‘hypothetical entities’?  Like a number of other authors, Frigg compares model systems to fictional 
entities, like unicorns or Count Dracula.34  Of course, the nature of fictional entities, and in particular 
the question of whether such entities exist at all, is itself the subject of considerable controversy. Frigg 
acknowledges this, but claims that his account incurs no ‘ontological commitments’ since Walton’s 
theory is antirealist with regard to fictional entities.35 And yet it is difficult to see how Frigg can take 
an antirealist stance on fictional entities, and thereby model systems, if these model systems are 
central to his account of theoretical modelling. If there are no model systems, what will do the t-
representing?
32 Frigg (2010), p253.
33 For more on the ontology of theoretical modelling, see Toon (2010).
34 The suggestion that models might be understood as fictional entities is found in Godfrey-Smith (2006) and 
Frigg (2006b).  Contessa (2010) follows this approach by developing his own ‘dualist’ account of fictional 
entities, while Thomson-Jones (2007) also explores versions of this view.
35Frigg (2010), p264.
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(iii) Make-believe and stipulation
In Section I, I argued that we may accept Callender and Cohen’s arguments in favour of adopting a 
derivative account of scientific representation, while rejecting their claim that stipulation is sufficient 
for scientific representation.  The account I have proposed offers a derivative account: it explains the 
representational power of models in terms of the representational power of certain mental states, 
namely those of the imagination.  For example, the bridge model represents the bridge in virtue of 
prescribing users to imagine that the bridge is a certain shape, length and so on.  Unlike Callender and 
Cohen’s stipulation view, however, my account is able to distinguish  model-representation from 
cases of mere denotation or reference.
According to MM1, in order to be a model-representation of some object, a model must not only refer 
to that object; there must be an understanding amongst those who use the model that various 
imaginings are prescribed that depend upon the features of the model.  This is absent in the case of 
Callender and Cohen’s salt shaker.  The act of stipulation they describe may establish that the salt 
shaker refers to Madagascar, but there is no understanding among the diners that they are to imagining 
anything about Madagascar, given the properties of the salt shaker.  For the same reason, my account 
is also able to exclude proper names: no convention exists such that we are to imagine certain things 
of the DNA molecule depending upon the properties of the name ‘DNA molecule’, such as the 
number of letters it has or whether it is written in English or French.
Earlier, we observed that the form of a name like ‘DNA molecule’ is ultimately arbitrary, while that 
of a scientific model is often crucial to its representational function.  Furthermore, we noted that 
scientific models seem to ‘tell us’ something about their objects, while names do not, and that what 
the model tells us can be right or wrong.  We are now in a position to explain these differences.  The 
reason that the properties of a model are important to its representational function, while those of 
names or Callender and Cohen’s salt shaker are not, is that the imaginings the model prescribes about 
its object are conditional on those properties.  What a model ‘tells us’ about its object is dependent on 
the content of those imaginings, and what it tells us is right or wrong depending on whether the 
propositions it asks us to imagine are true or false of that object.
Under certain circumstances, the salt shaker could become a model-representation of Madagascar. 
For example, we might imagine the shaker being used to indicate the location of Madagascar with 
respect to Africa (the dinner plate).  In this case, the salt shaker (together with the dinner plate) would 
constitute a model-representation on my account: the salt shaker’s properties prescribe us to imagine 
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something about Madagascar, according to rules such as ‘if the shaker is to the right of the plate, you 
are to imagine that Madagascar is to the east of Africa’.  One way to establish this rule would be to 
declare it explicitly.  As we have seen, however, principles of generation need not be stated explicitly. 
Many suggest themselves to us almost ‘automatically’.  Once we have explicitly specified that the salt 
shaker denote Madagascar and the plate denote Africa, it is almost inevitable that we will associate 
the relative positions of the salt shaker and the plate with the relative positions of Madagascar and 
Africa.  The ease with which we understand such conventions, however, should not mislead us into 
neglecting their importance.  No familiar principles of generation come to mind when we are told that 
the salt shaker represents Madagascar.  (Its shape does not readily suggest taking it to be a scale 
model of Madagascar, for example.)  In the absence of such principles, the salt shaker fails to model-
represent Madagascar and merely refers to it; its properties are irrelevant to its representational 
function, and it can tell us nothing about Madagascar.
(iv) Make-believe, misrepresentation and realism
In Section I, I argued that our theory of model-representation should be able to accommodate 
inaccurate (or incorrect or unrealistic) models as well as accurate ones.   The account I have offered 
meets this criterion.  According to MM1, a model represents an object if it makes propositions about 
that object fictional.  Once again, recall that propositions can be fictional in Walton’s sense and still 
be true.  For example, our model of the bouncing spring makes it fictional that the bob has mass m 
and that it is attached to a spring.  However, it is not a condition for model-representation on my 
account that all, or even any, of the propositions a model makes fictional be true.  For this reason, my 
account is able to accommodate inaccurate (or incorrect or unrealistic) models.  Our model still 
represents the spring, even though much of what it asks us to imagine about it is false: the bob is not a 
point mass, the spring is not massless, and so on.  Or again, like their final double-helical model, 
Crick and Watson’s early models represent the DNA molecule because they prescribe us to imagine 
things about the molecule.  It is simply that some, or even all, of what the early models ask us to 
imagine is false.
However, the accuracy, or realism, with which a model represents a system is often of considerable 
importance, of course.  There are many questions that we might ask in this regard.  Can we say 
anything general about the accuracy or realism of scientific models?  If we can, how realistic are 
scientific models in general and in what respects?  Are we justified in believing that scientific models 
are realistic representations of their objects?  In this paper I am concerned not with these questions, 
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but with the prior question of how scientific represent their target systems. As I have already noted, 
however, it would be desirable if our theory of model-representation provided us with a framework in 
which to address these questions about realism. The theory of model-representation I have proposed 
does provide such a framework, but this framework differs from that commonly employed.
On most accounts of scientific modelling, accuracy is judged in terms of some form of similarity or fit 
between a model and the world.  For example, as we have seen, Giere takes theoretical models to be 
abstract objects defined by the prepared descriptions and equations of motion scientists write down 
when they model a system.  The accuracy of a theoretical model is then a matter of the similarity 
between this abstract object and the system in certain respects and to certain degrees.  In contrast to 
this indirect view of theoretical modelling, I propose a direct view.36  On my account, there is no 
abstract object (or fictional entity or any other kind of object) that satisfies scientists’ prepared 
description and equation of motion; instead, the prepared description and equation represent the 
system directly, by prescribing imaginings about it.  However, this account still provides us with a 
simple way of understanding the accuracy or realism of a theoretical model: put simply, a model is 
accurate in a certain respect if and only if what it prescribes us to imagine in that respect is true of the 
object it represents.
For example, consider our model of the bouncing spring.  Whether this model is accurate is not a 
matter of whether some abstract ideal oscillator is similar to the bouncing spring.  The model is 
accurate if what it prescribes us to imagine of the spring is true.  For instance, the model prescribes us 
to imagine that the bob oscillates with a time period of T=2πm/ k .  The model is accurate in its 
prediction if, and only if, the bob does in fact oscillate with period T=2πm/ k .  On my account, 
then, the accuracy of a model is dependent upon the truth (or perhaps the approximate truth) of the 
propositions it prescribes us to imagine about the system it represents.  This view may be applied to 
physical, as well as theoretical models; as we have seen, on my account, even physical models 
prescribe us to imagine propositions about their objects.
(v) Models and works of fiction
Many of entities to which Walton applies his theory, such as novels, painting and films, are central 
examples of works of fiction.  If Walton does indeed offer the correct analysis of these works then, on 
my account, model-representation turns out to be an instance of a wider form of representation also 
instantiated by such works.  Some will object to this comparison.  Surely there are many differences 
36 Toon (2010)
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between our model of the bouncing spring and works of fiction such as War of the Worlds, or between 
an architect’s scale model and a statue of Napoleon?  Although I claim that models employ the same 
form of representation that Walton ascribes to works of fiction, I do not deny that there are many 
important differences between the two, as there are amongst works of fiction themselves.  Similarly, 
to claim that some scientific drawings employ the same mode of representation as cartoons and 
Surrealist paintings, namely depiction, would not prevent us recognising the enormous differences 
between these different representations.
And, although there clearly are important differences between models and some works of fiction, I 
think it is less clear where to draw a line between them, if one can be drawn at all.  It is clearly not 
correct to say that the imaginings models prescribe are generally true, or even approximately true, 
whereas those prescribed by works of fiction are not.  As we have seen, even good models prescribe 
many false imaginings about their objects.  Conversely, works of historical fiction often prescribe 
many true imaginings about actual characters and events, as do many portraits.  Moreover, given that 
we know that something is a work of historical fiction or a portrait, it is arguable that we are entitled 
to expect the work to be accurate in these ways.  The same considerations also show that we cannot 
draw the distinction in terms of whether or not the works aim at truth.  One important function of 
many scientific models is that of providing us with predictions.  But, again, this does not give a clear 
criterion for distinguishing models from works of fiction.  On the one hand, it seems that some models 
are not used to provide predictions.  Obvious examples here are the models we will consider in Part 
III, which do not represent an actual object.  And on the other hand, it is arguable that some works of 
fiction offer predictions.  One example here might be Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. 37
III Models without actual objects
(i) The variety of models without actual objects
As we noted in Section I(i), the problem of scientific representation is usually presented as that of 
giving an account of a relation between a model and some actual system, just as the problem of 
depiction is often said to be that of identifying a relation between a picture and its subject.  We also 
observed, however, that many pictures seem to be depictive, even though they depict no actual 
37 Note also that the position I advocate is distinct from what Arthur Fine calls fictionalism. (Fine (1998).  As 
Fine characterises it, fictionalism is an anti-realist position which argues that a scientific theory may be reliable 
without being true and without the entities it invokes existing.  To classify a model as a representation in 
Walton’s sense is to say nothing about the truth of the propositions the model prescribes or about the existence 
of the entities it invokes.
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subject.  An illustrated edition of Dracula might contain a picture of Count Dracula, for example, his 
fangs dripping with blood.  It seems that the picture represents or depicts Dracula, in a similar way to 
that in which a portrait like David’s Napoleon Crossing the Saint Bernard depicts Napoleon.  Of 
course, Count Dracula does not exist in the same way as Napoleon did.  But if the painting represents 
Dracula, must he not exist in some sense?  These problems also arise for discourse about fiction.  If 
we say ‘Dracula sucks blood’ it seems we assert something true.  And yet if Dracula does not exist, to 
what does the name ‘Dracula’ refer?  Solutions to these problems fall into two camps. 
Accommodationist theories grant fictional entities like Count Dracula some place in our ontology. 
Eliminativist theories attempt to show how fiction, and our discourse about it, may be understood 
without granting the existence of fictional entities.38
Many scientific models pose parallel problems.  Obvious examples are models of entities we once 
thought to exist but now know not to.  Nineteenth century physicists constructed mechanical models 
of the ether.  Even if, as we now believe, the ether does not exist, these models still seem to be 
representational.  Intuitively, we want to say that ether models represent something, even though we 
know there is no ether.  Just as we seem to need Dracula to understand pictures of the Count, so we 
seem to need the ether to understand the physicists’ models.  The problem also arises for our 
discourse: just as we make statements that seem to refer to Dracula, so we might make statements that 
appear to refer to the ether, like ‘the ether is at rest’.
The problems posed by models without actual objects is rarely recognised.  Where it is recognised, it 
is always models of discredited entities like the ether or phlogiston that are offered as examples.  In 
fact, however, problems with fictional entities arise for a much wider range of cases.  Many of these 
are rather mundane.  For example, suppose that engineers constructing a bridge invite architects to 
submit models of their proposed designs.  Like the ether models, a model proposing an unsuccessful 
design would still seem to be representational, even if there is no actual bridge that it represents. 
Many scientific experiments create events which may never otherwise occur; a scientist might 
formulate a theoretical model of such an event even if funding runs out and the experiment never 
takes place.  Or again, while using a ball-and-stick chemical model we might construct any number of 
models that represent configurations of atoms that do not exist.
In addition to examples such as these, there are clearly many cases of models that represent no 
particular actual object or event.  We say that Bohr’s model ‘represents the hydrogen atom’, for 
example, but presumably it does not represent any particular hydrogen atom (although it might be 
used to do so).  In fact, it is arguable that most scientific models are of this form.  In some cases, such 
38 The terms ‘accommodationist’ and ‘eliminativist’ are taken from Lamarque (2003).
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as that of the Bohr model, we might think that the model represents a type of entity or event.  R.I.G. 
Hughes elects to ‘assume without argument that our concept of denotation allows us to denote a type’ 
and offers Bohr’s model as an example.39  However, even allowing that we may make sense of the 
notion of a model representing a type, there are many models, or uses of models, that cannot be 
thought of in this way. 
A comparison with pictures might once again be helpful.  Many pictures would also appear to 
represent types.  Examples might include encyclopaedia illustrations representing certain species of 
plants or the famous diagrams of man and woman on the plaque of the Pioneer spacecraft.  But clearly 
not every picture that fails to represent a particular actual object may be thought of in this way.  For 
example, Vermeer’s The Milkmaid shows a woman pouring milk from a jug by a window.  Even if 
Vermeer used a model when painting the work, there is no actual woman that the painting represents, 
nor does it represent a type of woman.  Instead, the painting simply represents a particular fictional or 
‘imaginary’ woman.  There are numerous pictures of this sort.  As Goodman puts it, ‘the world of 
pictures teems with anonymous fictional persons, places, and things’.40
Analogous cases exist in scientific modelling.  Consider the Phillips machine.  The machine could be 
used to represent some actual economy, such as that of Britain.  Alternatively, perhaps it could be 
used to represent a type of economy.  But we could also use the machine simply to represent a 
particular ‘imaginary’ or fictional economy.  (We might begin by saying ‘suppose there were an 
economy like this…’.)  Or, to take another example, suppose that the ‘prepared description’ and 
equation of motion that we write down when we model the bouncing spring system were to appear 
instead in a textbook, written to instruct students on how to model a bouncing spring like ours.  In this 
case, it seems there will be no actual system that the model represents, nor type of system.  Instead, it 
represents an ‘imaginary’ or fictional bouncing spring that the student is to imagine encountering.41
Need an account of representation for scientific models accommodate those without actual objects? 
Callender and Cohen suggest we might ‘bite the bullet and hold that, in cases where x doesn’t exist, 
agents don’t succeed in representing x but merely believe they are representing x’.42  As we have seen, 
this would be to exclude a considerable number of models from our account of representation. 
Moreover, in many of the cases we have considered, agents do not even believe that they are 
39 Hughes (1997), S330-1
40 Goodman (1976), p26
41 This example reminds us that the same prepared description and equation of motion may serve very different 
representational functions.
42 Callender and Cohen (2006), p81 n11
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representing an actual object.  Most importantly, however, I think it is simply wrong to deny that 
models without actual objects are representational.
A comparison with pictures is helpful.  We take for granted that pictures without actual objects are 
representational.  Of course, we recognise that when we say that The Milkmaid is a ‘picture of a 
milkmaid’ this does not license the inference that the milkmaid exists.  However, even if she does not, 
the picture is undoubtedly still depictive.  Indeed, our experience of the picture depends very little 
upon whether or not the milkmaid exists.  We can still stand before the painting and admire her care 
and concentration in her task, just as we might look at David’s portrait and admire Napoleon’s 
bravery and determination.  The same is true of models.  Consider the architects’ models discussed 
earlier, each showing proposals for a bridge design.  Suppose that these models were all put on 
display after the bridge is built.   If we were to inspect the models without knowing which was 
chosen, our experience of the unsuccessful models would be very similar to that of the successful one. 
Looking at these models, which might be built from balsa wood or paper or construction kit, and 
might be a metre or ten metres high, we could still recognise each as representing a bridge to be built 
across the river, and discuss whether that bridge is ugly or beautiful, flimsy or strong.  Similarly, we 
realise that when we say a model ‘represents the ether’ we cannot conclude that there is an actual 
object that it represents.  But the model is still representational.  Indeed, the representational 
properties of ether models may have played an important role in allowing scientists to determine 
whether or not the ether exists.
In the next section, I will consider whether existing accounts of scientific representation can 
accommodate models without actual objects.  First, however, it is important that our present problem 
is distinguished from another way in which scientific modelling is sometimes thought to give rise to 
fictional entities.  This route to fictional entities arises from theoretical modelling of actual objects, 
like our model of the bouncing spring.  When we model the spring we make assumptions that are true 
of no actual system: no actual pendulum is a point mass, no actual spring is massless, and so on. 
Recently, as we have already seen, a number of authors have suggested that our model of the 
bouncing spring is itself a fictional entity that satisfies these modelling assumptions.  On this indirect 
view of theoretical modelling, our prepared description and equation of motion define a fictional 
idealised oscillator, and this, in turn, represents the bouncing spring.  Theoretical models are 
themselves taken to be fictional entities.
I have argued against this view elsewhere.43  For now, we may simply note that the ontology of 
theoretical models themselves is not the problem that concerns us here.  We want to know how our 
43 Toon (2010)
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account of representation can accommodate models without actual objects.  It is possible for these two 
problems to become confused.  Speaking loosely, we might say that our model of the bouncing spring 
‘represents’ a point mass or a massless spring.  Point masses and massless springs do not exist, of 
course, and it is tempting to label them as ‘fictional entities’.  Speaking more carefully, however, we 
should say that our model represents an actual pendulum bob as a point mass and it represents an 
actual spring as massless and frictionless.  For this reason, it does not present the same problem as 
models like the ether model.
Moreover, even if we take theoretical models to be fictional entities, rather than linguistic entities or 
abstract objects, this does not solve the problem posed by models that represent no actual object.  To 
see this, consider the theoretical model mentioned above, which represents an experimental event that 
never occurs. The problem we are faced with is that of explaining how it is that this model is 
representational, given that there is no actual object that it represents. Taking the model itself to be a 
fictional entity, rather than, say, a linguistic entity or abstract object, does not solve this problem.  Or 
again, suppose that, before it was discovered not to exist, someone had produced a theoretical model 
of the ether that was thought to offer a highly simplified account of its behaviour.  Even if we were to 
take the scientists’ ether model to be a fictional entity, defined by whatever assumptions and 
equations they wrote down, we would still be left with the problem that this model, like a mechanical 
ether model, seems intuitively to represent the ether, even though there is no ether.44
(ii) Existing accounts  of  scientific  representation and models  without actual 
objects
Most existing accounts conceive of representation in modelling as a relation.  This includes the 
similarity and isomorphism accounts criticised by Mauricio Suárez and Roman Frigg.45  It also 
includes Ronald Giere’s more sophisticated similarity account, on which scientists use models to 
represent systems by forming ‘theoretical hypotheses’ detailing their similarities.46  Although Hughes’ 
‘D.D.I. account’ is not intended to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for representation, 
Hughes does endorse the maxim ‘no representation without denotation’.47  Finally, as we have seen, 
44 Similarly, Frigg (2010) suggests that the problem of models without actual objects can be avoided simply by 
adopting his distinction between p-representation and t-representation.  This alone does not seem sufficient to 
solve the problem, however: we still require an account of t-representation that can explain how some model 
systems (like the simplified ether model system) can be representational, without representing any actual object.
45 Frigg (2006a), Suárez (1999) and (2003)
46 Giere (2004). Giere allows there may be other ways in which models are used to represent, although does not 
specify any.  See also Giere (1988) and (1999).
47 Hughes (1997), S331. ‘D.D.I.’ stands for ‘denotation, demonstration, and interpretation’. According to 
Hughes, these combine in the following way: `Elements of the physical world are denoted by elements of the 
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on Callender and Cohen’s view, representation in modelling is a relation established by an act of 
stipulation connecting a model and its object.  As they stand, none of these accounts can explain why 
models without actual objects are representational.  An ether model cannot represent in virtue of its 
similarity or isomorphism to the ether if the ether does not exist, nor could a scientist list the model 
and ether’s similarities in a theoretical hypothesis.  The model also cannot denote or stand for the 
ether, and we cannot establish a representation relation between the model and the ether by 
stipulation.
If accounts that take representation in modelling to be a relation are to be applied to models without 
actual objects, then their proponents must posit some object for these models to represent.  That is, 
they must adopt an accommodationist stance on fictional entities.  Whether this is thought to be 
problematic would depend upon which accommodationist view was adopted and how palatable its 
ontological commitments were taken to be.  However, it would be a mistake to assume that the 
problem disappears once we posit fictional entities.  In fact, questions would remain for each of the 
accounts.  For example, would the objects posited to serve as fictional entities have the right 
properties to enter into relations of similarity or isomorphism with models?  The claim that models 
may denote fictional entities, just as they denote actual entities, would also be open to debate. 
Fictional objects are dependent on representations for their existence in a way that actual objects are 
not; the relation between a representation and a fictional object, if there are any, would therefore 
appear very different from that between a representation and an actual object.48  Finally, could we say 
that the ether model is representational because it was stipulated that it represent a fictional ether?  If 
any stipulation occurred it was surely that the model represent the real ether.
The only account of scientific representation that attempts to accommodate models that represent no 
actual object is Mauricio Suárez’s ‘inferential conception’.  On this view, a representational source A 
represents some target B ‘only if (i) the representational force of A points towards B and (ii) A allows 
competent and informed agents to draw specific inferences regarding B.’49 At first sight, then, it seems 
that the inferential conception also regards representation as a relation.  However, Suárez argues that 
this account can accommodate what he calls ‘fictional representation, that is, representations of 
nonexisting entities’, and in fact, he claims that on his account ‘there is absolutely no difference in 
kind between fictional and real-object representation – other than the existence or otherwise of the 
target’.50
model; the model possesses an internal dynamic that allows us to demonstrate theoretical conclusions; these in 
turn need to be interpreted if we are to make predictions' (Hughes (1997), S325).
48 Walton (1990), p127
49 Suárez (2004), p773
50 Ibid., p770
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How is this supposed to work?  Consider an ether model.  Even though the ether does not exist, 
perhaps there is a sense in which we might say that the model possesses a representational force 
‘towards the ether’ just as, for example, a model of the Forth Road Bridge possesses a 
representational force towards the bridge.  The ether model is rather like a description such as ‘the 
only inhabitant of London’: both purportedly pick out an object; they simply fail to do so because that 
object does not exist.  However, it is not clear that we may say this in all cases.  For example, consider 
the case discussed above, in which the Phillips machine is used to represent an ‘imaginary’ economy. 
Unlike the creator of an ether model, the user of the Phillips machine does not attempt, but fail, to 
represent an actual object.  When used in this way, the Phillips machine does not purport to represent 
any actual object.  As a result, it is difficult to make sense of the idea that this model possesses a 
representation force, even a thwarted one, presuming that representational force always points 
towards actual objects or events.  Of course, we might attempt to get round this problem by granting 
the existence of fictional entities and allowing that representational force may point to them too.  But 
then the claim that there is no difference between representation of fictional entities and of actual ones 
would require further argument for, as mentioned already, the relation between a representation and a 
fictional object and the relation between a representation and an actual object would appear to be 
rather different.
(iii) Models as make-believe and models without actual objects
Unlike similarity and isomorphism accounts, Hughes’ D.D.I. account or Callender and Cohen’s 
stipulation view, the account of models I set out above (MM) does not take representation in 
modelling to be a relation.  It is therefore able to accommodate models that represent no actual object 
without postulating some object for them to represent.  Something is a model-representation if it has 
the function of serving as a prop in games of make-believe; it is not a necessary condition for model-
representation that there be any object that the model prescribe imaginings about.  Ether models, or 
the textbook model of a bouncing spring or the model for an experiment that does not take place, are 
all representational because they function as a prop in a game of make-believe; all of them are taken 
to prescribe imaginings.  They can still fulfil this role even if there is no object that they prescribe 
imaginings about.
Of course, other accounts of representation in art and elsewhere, apart from Walton’s, acknowledge 
that it may fail to be a relation in certain cases.  For example, although Hughes bases his D.D.I. 
account on Goodman’s theory of representation, Goodman does not endorse Hughes’ maxim ‘no 
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representation without denotation’.  Instead, Goodman allows that denotation may fail in certain cases 
and considers it necessary only that representations are ‘ostensibly provided with denotata’.51  For 
example, we might say that ‘the only inhabitant of London’ is ostensibly provided with a denotatum; 
it simply fails to denote because no one happens to satisfy the description.  Walton’s position is more 
radical.  On his account, the notion of having an object is not central to representation in any way.  He 
asks us to imagine a society of people who make pictures, say, ‘of people’ or ‘of trees’, but never 
pictures that depict actual people or trees.  Drawing or painting a person is thought of as creating or 
making an imaginary person and not representing any real person.  And yet, Walton argues, these 
pictures would still be representational.  Unlike Suárez’s inferential conception, then, my account can 
accommodate cases in which there is not even attempted reference to any object, like Phillips machine 
being used to represent an ‘imaginary’ economy.
Problems concerning fictional entities have not been entirely dispelled, however.  For in addition to 
prescribing many unproblematic imaginings, such as that the speed of light is constant or that 
electromagnetic waves are transverse, intuitively it seems that an ether model will also prescribe 
imaginings ‘about the ether’.  For example, it may ask us to imagine that the ether is at rest.  Once 
again, then, we meet the problem of fictional entities, this time for imagination: how are we to 
understand the contents of imaginings that appear directed towards fictional entities like the ether? 
This is certainly a problem, but it is not one that a theory of representation for scientific models need 
address.  Instead, it is a general problem that faces all theories of intentionality.  And it is a problem 
that will exist whatever account of representation we adopt for scientific models; even those who hold 
similarity or isomorphism accounts will concede that we often appear to imagine things of the ether.  52 
The same is true of the problem posed by discourse apparently referring to fictional entities, like ‘the 
ether is at rest’ or ‘the bridge is stable’ (said in reference to a failed bridge model).  This too is a 
general problem that exists whatever our account of scientific representation and is the subject of 
longstanding debate.
51 Goodman (1976), p228.  Emphasis in original.
52 Callender and Cohen also attempt to defer the problem posed by models without actual objects, observing that 
’the worry arises for all species of representation – not just scientific representation – and there is no reason to 
suspect that whatever ultimately explains representations of unicorns and golden mountains won’t work for 
representation of phlogiston and the ether’ (Callender and Cohen (2006), p81).  There is an important difference 
between Callender and Cohen’s deferral strategy and my own, however.  Callender and Cohen simply express a 
hope that a solution to the problem for other forms of representation may be applied to scientific models.  They 
tentatively suggest a ‘Humean strategy’, which provides a relational theory for ‘atomic’ representations and 
explains representations without actual objects as constructed as ‘compounds’ of other representations.  But they 
do not show whether this can be applied to scientific models, nor whether their account would remain intact if it 
were.  This amounts simply to deferring the problem for scientific representation itself.  By contrast, my own 
account reduces the problem of understanding models without actual objects to the more general problem of 
understanding imaginings about fictional entities.
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Conclusion
Scientific models are props in games of make-believe, which represent their objects by prescribing 
imaginings about them.  Analysing models in this way allows us to accommodate models which 
represent their objects inaccurately, while showing how models differ from merely denoting entities, 
like Callender and Cohen’s salt shaker.  Since this account does not take representation in modelling 
to be essentially relational, it is also able to accommodate an important group of models that have 
been largely ignored by recent philosophical work on modelling, namely those that are 
representational, but represent no actual object.
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